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Abstract 
The discipline of security lacks formal conceptual tools which can be used by security 
managers, advisers and consultants when attempting to provide effective seCIJrity. This 
is because of security's relative age as a discipline, it is very new. 
The aim oft he thesis was to contribute to the security discipline by taking 
Underwood's ( 1989) idea of security decay and to a certain extent exploring and 
fonnalising it. The security decay theory is primarily concerned with the influence 
apathy has on security and how management react to risk materialisation when decay is 
evident. The thesis focused on the first ofthese two components only. 
In focusing on the influence apathy has on security, a number of Likert tests were 
administered to a stratified sample of both security specialists and non- security 
people. The security specialist sample provided good indications that effective security 
will be provided when a synergy of functions and elements are implemented. This 
sample also believed that apathetic attitudes towards security would cause the 
effectiveness of security to decrease. 
The results derived from the non - security sample were inconclusive, with no 
determinations to be made. This sample were unsure as to whether or not effective 
security was achievable, whether effective security would cause a lack of security 
incidence and whether a lack of security incidence would result in apathy towards 
security. 
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The results achieved are only representative of the attitudes of the respondents from 
within the sample. The two tests that derived conclusive results can not be generalised 
across the whole security specialist population. This was the major limitation of the 
thesis. 
The recommendations resulting from the study include the need to further research the 
security decay theory in a longitudinal study, as well as researching the section of the 
theory which was excluded in this thesis. The implications for security specialists are 
that they need to have an awareness of the ramifications of having effective security. 
Also, the fact that the non - security sample were generally unsure about all sub -
concepts put to them highlights the need for efficient and effective awareness and 
education programs. 
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Definition of Terms 
Security Decay : 
Risk: 
Security: 
Residual Risk: 
Risk Exposure: 
Threat: 
a concept and phenomena where effective security 
indirectly causes an attitude of apathy towards the 
provision of security, resulting in ineffectiveness 
" The chance of something happening that will have an 
impact upon objectives. It is measured in terms of 
consequences and likelihood" (AS/NZS: 4360, 1995) 
" ... implies a stable, relatively predictable 
environment in which an individual or group may pursue 
its ends without disruption or harm and without fear of 
destruction or injury" (Fischer and Green, 199?, p. 3) 
The degree of risk an organisation is exposed to after 
the implementation of countenneasures. 
The level of risk the organisation is exposed to prior to 
countermeasure implementation. 
A threat may be defined as a situation, event or 
action which will affect, or has the potential to 
effect, the security of an asset 
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Countermeasure : 
Criticality : 
Intelligence : 
Defence in Depth : 
CPTED: 
A security measure, used to 'counter' a designated threat 
or threats 
Also known as consequence. A factor ofham1 or damage 
which is to be considered when conducting a risk 
assessment 
" The product resulting from the processing of 
information concerning actual and potential situations, 
events, risks and threats to an organisation and its 
activities" (Blades, 1997, p. 2). 
A security theory concerned with the layering of 
countermeasures to provide deterrence, a degree of 
detection and delay, as well as aiding response actions 
Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design. A 
security theory outlining the benefits to be derived from 
natural access, natural surveillance and territoriality 
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When we have a free path, we go forward 
If we meet 2n obstacle, we go around it 
If the object can not be overcome, we retreat 
When the enemy is unprepared, we surprise him 
If he is alert, we leave him alone 
(Bader Meinhof, www.tscm.com) 
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CHAPTER! 
INTRODUCTION 
Background of Security Theory 
Security as an academic discipline is in its infancy and has only relatively recentiy 
begun taking its first steps towards being fully recognised in its own right. As a result 
of this, the body of literature and conceplUaltools available for analysis are small 
when compared to other, more well established disciplines. 
However there are a number of related theories, ao; well as specific security theories, 
that have been either adapted, evolved or developed over the years. Security theories 
cover broad areas which are reflective of 1he nature of security itself. One will find 
technological security theory, sociological security theory and psy~hological security 
theory. The reason for such an integration of various fields into the security discipline 
is because of security's wide ranging scope, within both an organisation and society. 
There is a complex interrelationship between technology, people and management 
processes within a security function and because of this, a variety of differing fields 
have been utilised to aid in the provision of effective security. Each of these areas will 
influence the practicing of security and it is for this reason that these areas are of 
considerable importance. 
As an example, the theory surrounding risk management did not originate from the 
field of security, but from fields such as environmental science (Fiskel and Covello, 
I 
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1986), engineering (Crossland, Bennett, Ellis, Farmer, Gittus, Godfrey, Hambly, 
Kletz, and Lees 1992), medicine (Cooper, 1985), political science (Glen, 1993) and 
finance and insurance (Vaughan. 1982). However the application of this theory is welJ 
suited to the provision of security and has therefore been integrated into the security 
discipline by a substantial number of authors (Toft, 1997; Broder, 1984; Fites & 
Kratz, 1993; Schultheiss, 1994; DePasquale, 1989; Fay, 1993; Oliver & Wilson, 1988; 
Elbra, 1992; Strut! & Patrick, 1995; Custance, 1996: Healy & Walsh, 1996; and 
Kinsman & Tarr, 1996). 
This study sets out. as one of its primary aims, to increase the body of security 
knowledge by developing and enhancing the term "security decay" which was first 
used by Underwood ( 1989, p. 249) in his book entitled "The Security of Buildings." 
The Security Decay Theory 
The security decay theory can be viewed as consisting of a seven step process as seen 
in Figure 1. The security decay theory ali a whole will include two primary 
components; apathy. which is postulated to be caused by effective security, which in 
turns creates decay, and an incorrect reaction to risk materialisation caused by decay. 
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Effective 
Security 
I 
Prevent 
Attack 
I 
Apathy I 
I 
By By 
Staff Management 
I 
Security 
Decay 
J 
Attack 
Succeeds 
I 
Reaction 
I 
Increase 
Security 
Measures 
Figure I: The Security Decay Theory 
However the theory as a whole was not examined within the study, as this would have 
presented too large a task. The section of the security decay theory, which was 
examined, can be seen in Figure 2. 
3 
Security Decay : The erosion of effective security 
Effective 
Security 
I 
Prevent 
Attack 
I 
Apathy 
I 
By By 
Staff Management 
I 
Security 
Decay 
Figure 2: Security Decay Theory; section under examina:io11 
The dependant variable within the section of the theory under examination in the 
study is security decay, with the independent variables being effective security, the 
prevention of threat occurrence and apathy. 
Effective security refers to a state where security's role has been defined, the need for 
security established and the level of protection required having been achieved. 
Effective security is postulated to exist when the level of risk exposure is reduced, 
through various means, to a level that is acceptable to the organisation. 
It is postulated that the result of having effective security will be the possible 
prevention of threat occurrences. A lack of security threat occurrences may result in an 
attitude of apathy towards security by those influenced by it. When those people 
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become apathetic, they may cease to comply with security policy and procedure, 
which is postulated to cause a decaying of security effectiveness. 
For people to become apathetic towards security, according to the security decay 
theory, they must first believe that security can reach a state of effectiveness, and that 
this will cause threat occurrences to be prevented. Also, they must believe that a lack 
of security incidents will result in an attitude of apathy. If any of these variables are 
missing within any given scenario, then the security decay theory will not be 
applicable. 
The theory is robust as it extends beyond giving reason to an erosion of security 
effectiveness, by providing a possible explanation as to why management often react 
with an over - kill of security col!ntenneasures. That is, when decay is attributable, a 
higher level of security may not be needed, but the required action may be to re-
establish the original level of protection. However this section of the theory is not 
under examination within the thesis. 
Background of the Security Decay Theory 
The premise behind the concept of security decay is that the more effective is security, 
the greater the probability that at some time in the near future, the need for security 
will diminish. Thus security is postulated to be working towards its own demise 
(Underwood, 1989, p. 249). This outcome results because of apathy on behalf of staff, 
management and contractors towards security. Indeed Underwood (1989, p. 249) can 
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be quoted as saying; "It [decay] is almost exclusively a function of the human 
component of a security system." 
If security is reducing security risk, then the perception generated by the stakeholders 
towards security may be one of unnecessariness. When people do not perceive the 
need for security, apathy towards it is the logical resultant effect. 
In his book, Underwood ( 1989, p. 249-250) states that, "The provision of effective 
security is paradoxically the first step towards decay." As we are aware, a paradox is a 
statement that seems to be self-contradictory but contains a truth. Thus security decay 
can be perceived as a paradox as security is ultimately working towards it's own 
demise, as the more effective it is in theory, the less likely it will be needed in some 
point in the near future. 
Security within an organisation is, like other specialties, working towards a goal. All 
of the planning and other efforts are directed towards achieving this goal (Bartol, 
Martin, Tein & Matthews, 1995, p. 154). Ultimately this goal is directed towards 
maximising the profit of the organisation by reducing the level of risk exposure and 
devising means to management risk realisation. Security will be seen to be successful 
if it is able to achieve this goal. To accomplish this, the security function must deter, 
deny, detect, delay (Hayes, 1991, p. 93) and respond to attacks effectively and 
efficiently. 
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If security is effective, and it is able to repel or prevent attacks, as well as detect, delay 
and respond to attacks, then what can be expected as a result? 
The decay theory argues that the result of effective security is security being seen as 
unnecessary (Underwood, 1989, p. 249-250). With effective security in place, there 
are no incidents of threat occurrence. A situation where the security system is 
unchallenged may result in the prevailing attitude by staff and management being that 
security is unnecessary. It may be logical to think that if we have A in place to have an 
effect on B, but when B is not present, then the need for A diminishes (where A is the 
security countenneasure and B is threat occurrence). 
When a threat eventuates it will come to the attention of management. The question 
they wiJJ now ask is; 'As a security incident has occurred, were the measures in place 
suitable'? 
Underwood (1989) argues that often the answer to the above question is: as a security 
incident has occurred, the measures could not have been suitable. Management will 
then devise new security measures that offer a level of protection above that which the 
original measures offered. The disadvantage in reacting incorrectly, such as increasing 
the level of protection when decay is evident, is appropriately emphasised by Hansen 
(1992, p. 44) when he states that; 
"All too often security risks are taken seriously only after information [asset] 
is lost. The reaction is a flurry of expensive and mostly ineffective 
countermeasures." 
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The security dec;:ty theory will be cyclic in nature as once management increases 
security above the original level, it is argued that 'effective security' is achieved and 
the process begins again. 
Security Decay - an example 
If an organisation had a policy in place that required the scanning of computer hard 
drives for vituses before using, and over a given period of time there were no virus 
attacks on the organisation's computer systems (as a result of this policy), the users of 
the computer systems may believe that the scanning of hard drives for viruses is 
unnecessary and a waste of valuable time. Underwood (1989, p. 249-250) argues that 
at this point in the process, and as a result of security being seen as unnecessary, the 
only logical result will be decay. 
To continue the example, as the users feel that scanning for viruses is a waste of time, 
they may bypass the scanning procedure. This amounts to decay in security as 
management have a policy and procedure in place to counter the threat, but it is not 
being complied with as security is now seen as unnecessary because of the lack of 
threat occurrence (no virus attacks). 
Decay is obviously not restricted to computer security efforts. It may also occur in 
access control procedures, guard patrol procedures, confidential infonnation control 
procedures, cash handling procedures and all other areas of security operations which 
are reliant on the compliance by st:.1ff. 
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Decay is now evident, as the users are not scanning for viruses. Then as a result of this 
decay, a virus successfully penetrates the computer system and all data contained 
therein is lost. Security will then be seen as necessary again. 
With virus penetration (threat occurrence) comes a reaction by management which is 
often inappropriate, as management did not contribute the cause of the threat 
occurrence to decay. Management may now insist that integrity checkers, behaviour 
blockers and disk validation systems be implemented (Ford, 1995, p. 141). This would 
allow for a significantly higher level of virus protection. But in this circumstance, the 
measures were suitable and it was the decay of these measures that resulted in the 
threat materialising. Therefore all that is required is to re-establish and re -emphasis 
the original virus scanning measures. 
The Purpose of the Study 
Security managers, consultants and advisors need to be able to refer to conceptual 
tools when providing advice on complex security issues such as the management of 
security risk. The greater the number of relevant analytical and management tools 
available, the more likely it is that the security function can positively contribute 
towards organisational goals. 
The aim and purpose of the thesis was to contribute towards the generation of 
conceptual tools in the security discipline. This purpose has been accomplished by 
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enhancing the security decay theory through the testing of perceptions and attitudes of 
this model. 
The Significance of the Study 
The security decay theory is one which has received little attention and one must 
assume this to be because of its relative obscurity. To date, the security decay theory 
had not been fonnally studied. While this situation alone may highlight the need for 
further exploration of a theory, it is believed that th" nature of security decay and the 
potential consequences that may arise from its occurrence warranted it being 
examined. 
Security from an application viewpoint, is a discipline of some importance as people 
rely on it in all fonns for physical well -being, and organisations rely on it for the 
protection of valuable and critical assets. The further development and refinement of 
the security discipline therefore will provide innovative and effective ways in ensuring 
the safety of the community a'i well as contributing towards the success of an 
organisation. 
Also, as the security discipline continues to develop, theories relating to differing 
aspects must be explored. This exploration of the security decay theory will contribute 
towards the goal, as the security discipline will have gained another conceptual tool 
for analysis. 
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Research Questions 
There are a number of pertinent questions that must be considered before the 
relevance of the security decay theory can be judged. Upon the completion of this 
study, the research questions wiil have been sufficiently addressed, with consideration 
for limitations and scope of the study. 
While the testing of the entire security decay theory is beyond the scope of the study, 
the questions of the theory that wiii be addressed include: 
-What constitutes effective security and is effective security achievable? 
-Does effective security cause an attitude of apathy towards the provisio'l of 
security? 
-Does an apathetic attitude towards the provision of security cause a decaying 
of security? 
For the security decay theory to be evident, security must be functionh~g so wen as to 
cause people to think that there is no need for it. It is proposed that if security is not 
effective, then security decay is not the cause of threat occurrence. This outcome 
warrants the inclusion of the question regarding what constitutes effective security. 
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An intriguing question of the study is whether or not people believe that effective 
security will result in apathy. Will people believe that security becomes an 
unnecessary burden when it has proved so successful as to prevent threat occurrence? 
When there is no threat occurrence because of successful security, will people become 
apathetic? 
For the decay theory to be considered a relevant theory in the security discipline, it 
must be shown that apathy towards security will cause security to decay, or decrease 
in effectiveness. Establishing this effect is beyond the scope of this study and 
therefore the assessment of peoples' initial perceptions will be an important first step 
towards making a detennination. 
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CHAPTER2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature review wm outline a number of factors that must be considered in a 
study of security decay. As there have been no previous studies conducted on security 
decay, the literature review will focus on relevant topics such as risk, security decay, 
maintenance and decay, complacency and security decay, overconfidence and security 
decay, and research methodologies. 
Risk is a concept of immense importance from a security viewpoint. It is not possible 
to implement a security program of any worth without first assessing and considering 
the security risk. This principle is supported by Sennewald (cited in Broder, 1984, p. 
7) who argues that; 
" Before a question of security can be addressed, it is first necessary to identify 
those harmful events which may befall any given enterprise." 
Risk is often used in reference to security issues, but it may be argued that it is never 
fully understood. Ansell and Wharton (1992, p. 4) state; 
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" The origin of the word risk is thought to be either the Arabic word risq or the 
Latin word risicum ... [The Arabic word] has connotations of a fortuitous and 
favourable outcome ... [fhe Latin word] originally referred to the challenge that 
a barrier reef presents to a sailor and clearly has connotations of an equally 
fortuitous but unfavourable event." 
Ansell et al. (1992, p 4) believe that in English usage the word has very negative 
connotation such as" you run the risk of..." or" ... at risk." For example, the 
Australian Oxford Dictionary (1988, p. 401) defines risk as;" [the] possibility of 
meeting danger or suffering harm ... " 
Therefore as Ansell et al. (1992, p. 4) state; 
"Clearly over time and in common usage the meaning of the word has changed 
from one of simply describing any unintended or unexpected outcome, good or 
bad ... to undesirable outcomes and the chance of their occurrence." 
One could argue therefore that risk has now taken on a negative form, and this form 
would seem to be evident in a security context, as security professionaJs are dealing 
with risk as an unfavourable occurrence. 
Westhuizen ( 1990, p. 36) however makes reference to both positive and negative risk, 
in the fonn of speculative and pure risk. Speculative risk is a risk which will either 
result in a gain or a loss if the risk is realised; for example, the trading of shares on the 
14 
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stock market. Pure risk however will, if realised, result in either a loss or a no loss 
situation. Examples of pure risk include fire, flooding, theft, industrial espionage, 
sabotage and fraud. 
However it is important to note the term, 'if realised'. Blades (1996, p. I) defines risk 
as; " the possible occurrence of an undesirable event, or the uncertainty of financial 
loss." The key words in this definition are "possible occurrence" and .. uncertainty". 
As Foster (1995/96,72) points out; 
" If there is no uncertainty then knowledge exists. If knowledge about the future 
exists then we have a deterministic environment- for example:" you will die". 
This is deterministic - certain. This is not risk; it is a fact. Thus regardless of 
how you define risk, it must incorporate an element of uncertainty." 
Therefore from a security viewpoint, when one refers to risk, one more commonly 
refers to possible, uncertain occurrences that will cause no financial gain, but some 
degree of hann. However, and while many security professionals do not appear to be 
taking advantage of this, it is becoming increasingly important to view security risk in 
a speculative sense. Dalton ( 1989) highlights this when he argues that the security 
function must take on a more competitive, value added role within the organisation, 
that the 'corporate cop' image be disbanded and security become more economically 
accountable. Security risk must be viewed as an opportunity to add to the financial 
performance of the organisation. While the security event itself (theft, fraud or fire) 
15 
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will not produce an opportunity for financial gain, the implementing of security to 
negate these risk events will (Jones, 1994, p. 96). 
Security's ability to generate profit through the practicing of risk management is 
appropriately outlined by Toft (1997, p. 89) in Figure 3. 
Coot 
....... 
Predicted cost ol 
risks with control ~~J_----J_------------------~~~~~--- ~me 
Figure 3: Risk Management's ability to generate profit 
The figure 3 shows that by expending resources on the controlling of risk, so long as 
the cost of the resources combined with the cost of the remaining risk is less than the 
cost of the original risk, then the provision of security countenneasures will provide 
for a profit. 
The reason why risk itself must be given due consideration is because of the nature 
and relationship between risk and security. Any security related research must include 
acknowledgment of the influence risk has upon security. The relationship between 
risk and security decay is found in the perception of security risk and the assessment 
and management of risk and decay. 
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The way in which people perceive their level of risk exposure will influence the 
decisions they make. Robbins, Waters- Marsh, Cacioppo and Millet (1994, p. 163) 
define perception as: " a process by which individuals organise and interpret their 
sensory impressions in order to give meaning to their environment." If the security 
program in place is effectively reducing the level of risk exposure the organisation 
faces. the staff and management may perceive their environment as having no security 
risk present. This perception may lead to apathy. 
Pidgeon, Hood, Jones, Turner and Gibson (1992, p. 101) upon discussing risk 
perception argue that there are two types of risk; "dread risk" and "unknown risk". 
Unknown risk refers to the degree of familiarity towards the risk. If security is 
effectively reducing risk to such an extent that no threats are occurring, then the risk 
becomes unknown or unfamiliar and the perception of the risk changes accordingly. In 
this instance, one may be unfamiliar with the risk and therefore one could argue, 
perceiving that there is no present danger. This perception of the risk may again lead 
to apathy. 
Tversky and Kahneman ( 1982) outline another factor influencing the perception of 
risk and therefore the degree of apathy that a person may have. This factor is known as 
the "availability heuristic" (Tversky et al. 1982, p. 18). The word heuristic simply 
refers to a judgmental rule (Slovic, Fischhoff and Lichtenstein, 1982, p. 464), with 
heuristics ultimately being used to simplify complex mental tasks. The availability 
heuristic refers to a situation where an event which has happened more recently, or on 
numerous occasions, will be more mentally available to a person. In - effect events 
17 
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(including security events) that are more easily recalled by a person will be considered 
more often than events, which are not, even to a point where events that are not easily 
recalled are ignored. 
In the decay context, a lack of security incidents will result in the person having a 'low 
level of availability'; they will not recall security incidents and therefore not consider 
them. This may result in the person giving little consideration to security and 
effectively becoming apathetic towards it. 
The elements of cultural theory, as outlined by Wartofsky (1986), will be another 
factor influencing the way in which a person perceives risk. Wartofsky (1986) argues 
that peoples' cultural surroundings will influence them to see risk in a certain manner. 
Cultural influences are derived from the value system within which the person resides 
and values, one can argue, are "socially constituted, socially learned and socially 
enforced" (Wartofsky, 1986, p. 131). The culture within the organisation may be one 
in which the need to comply with security policy is non - existent. The organisation 
may have a very weak security culture which will influence the degree of apathy 
towards the provision of security. 
The security professional must practice risk management in an organisation. The 
Australian I New Zealand Standard on Risk Management (AS 4360: 1995) defines risk 
management as the; 
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" ... systematic application of management policies, procedures and practices to 
the tasks of identifying, analysing, assessing, treating and monitoring risk." 
Without practicing risk management, it will be unknown as to whether the cause of 
security incidence is due to security decay, unsuitable security countermeasures, a 
changing threat environment and so on. This is because a reactive approach to security 
will see decisions made without analysis. If risk management is practiced, all variables 
will be assessed. If risk management is practiced and decay is attributable, then the 
resulting management decision will be more appropriate and less costly. 
The accuracy of the risk analysis is also an issue. As Broder (1984, p. 2) states; 
"[risk analysis] ... is a method for estimating the anticipated or expected loss 
from the occurrence of some adverse event. The key word here is estimating, 
because risk analysis will never be an exact science." 
As a result of risk analysis being at best an estimation of the condition, one must 
always be wary of the results. 
The risk management process consists of completing a risk analysis and then 
projecting the level of protection on the risk analysis results. However if this level of 
protection turned out to be higher than needed, the effect between the next review may 
be a decay of security countermeasures. The reason for this is because an over 
emphasis of security will only cause security to be seen as unnecessary. 
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Therefore a delicate balance must be struck between the minimal and maximum 
security countermeasures needed. Too little security may result in high risk 
materialisation, while too much security may result in decay leading to risk 
materialisation. 
Broder (1984, p. 41) correctly states that one step in the risk management process is 
the conducting of a security survey. One of the aims of the security survey is to 
determine the vulnerabilities that exist within the organisation. Fites and Kratz (1993, 
p. 53) describe a vulnerability as a security weakness which does not in itself cause 
damage but is a condition that will aid threat occurrence. Security decay is an example 
of a vulnerability. Security decay will provide a condition that will aid threat 
occurrence, as although security measures are in place, they are no longer operating to 
their intended level of effectiveness. 
Security Decay Literature 
As has been stated, the security decay term was first used by Underwood (1989) in his 
book "The Security of Buildings." The following reference to security decay is the 
most prominent. Underwood (1989, p. 249) states that; 
"The provision of effective security is paradoxically, the first step towards 
decay. This is because the effective system will not only repel successful 
attacks, but will also prevent the attacks being made; the illusion is thus 
created that the security is unnecessary and decay will follow until the degree 
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of security falls to the point at which the attack succeeds. In such cases the 
immediate reaction is often to increase the original security measures 
established, but in fact this is not usually necessary and all that may be 
required is the re - establishment of the intended level of protection." 
Apart from Underwood's (1989) reference to decay, although the remaining literature 
does not specifically discuss the concept of security decay, there is literature on decay 
with reference to maintenance and on other factors which may lead to an erosion of 
security such as complacency and overconfidence. 
Maintenance and Decay 
The principle of decay has been proposed by Howlett ( 1995) upon presenting a paper 
on maintenance issues with regards to security systems to the 1995 International 
Carnahan Conference on Security Technology. Howlett (1995, p. 223) argues that 
maintenance should not be left for too long a period as the system will deteriorate to 
an unacceptable level. Howlett (1995) illustrates this maintenance issue in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4 : Maintenance and Decay 
The figure 5 below has been adapted from the previous diagram from Howlett (1995) 
to include security tenninology which presents the security decay theory in graphical 
format. 
A: Security Measure Implementation 
A 
Security 
B: Threat Occurrence 
Time 
Figure 5 : Security decay in graphical format 
22 
Security Decay : The erosion of effective security 
Security Decay and Complacency 
In regards to complacency, Nossiter (1993, pp. 1 - 6) stated in an interview with a 
prominent security consultant that; "There's danger in complacency about the 
possible threats from terrorists at the 2000 Olympic Games ... " Adams (1996, p. 40-
41) stated, in an article on Qantas and security, that;" Australia's official terrorist 
threat to airports and airliners is currently low, but there's no room for 
complacency ... " Also Gips (1996, p. 51) upon discussing security issues within CNN 
stated that;" ... the bureau has recently switched guard service companies because the 
officers were becoming too familiar with personnel and too complacent ... " 
While it is important for security professionals to be aware of complacency, it must be 
stressed that there is a difference between complacency and security decay. 
Complacency can result when security measures are both poor or adequate, security 
decay on the other hand, can only occur when security is effective as it is the 
effectiveness of security that is postulated to cause decay. Security decay is to be 
viewed in a specific, theoretical context. 
Overconfidence and Security Decay 
Purpura (1991, p. 123) in discussing how a person was able to penetrate White House 
security stated that; 
"Did the Secret Service believe its protection measures were impenetrable? 
Perhaps this thinking allowed security to defeat itself. Indeed a false sense of 
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security can leave an organisation open to serious and unexpected 
vulnerabilities. Security practitioners can develop a feeling of invulnerability 
and overconfidence in their actions and plans." 
If personnel within the organisation become over confident with the effectiveness of 
the implemented security countermeasures, they are indeed likely to become apathetic. 
While over confidence may result in an erosion or decaying of security, this effect is 
different from that which is postulated in the security decay theory. The security decay 
theory is specifically concerned with the effect an effective security program has on 
the behaviour of personnel towards it. It is postulated by the theory that apathy is a 
result of effective security preventing threat occurrence. 
Methodology Literature 
In the conducting of a research study, it is important to draw upon literature relating to 
various methodological issues one may encounter. 
The study focused upon collecting and analysing peoples attitudes to selected 
elements of the security decay theory. Therefore, the method used must be one which 
is suitable for the measurement of attitudes. 
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Likert tests 
It has been stated by Keats (1988, p. 258) that attitude measurement began with the 
development of scale values by Thurstone who discovered that by using scale 
measurements, it was possible to collect both negative and positive attitudes on a 
particular subject. Following Thurstones' work, Likert proposed that; 
"the methods which had been previously been developed for constructing 
objective tests of cognitive abilities could be applied to the construction and 
use of scales for measuring attitudes" (Keats, 1988, p. 258). 
Dane (1990, p. 272) defines the Likert scale in the following manner; 
"The Likert scale consists of items reflecting extreme positions on a 
continuum, items with which people are likely to either agree or disagree." 
The development and administration of Likert tests has been discussed by many 
authors (Keats, 1988, p. 258; Anderson, 1988, p. 427; Lin, 1976, p. 183; Best, 1981, 
p. 181; Payne, 1974, p. 189; Lewin, 1979, p. 159; Dane, 1990, p. 272; Thorndike and 
Hagen, 1969, p. 414; Bordens and Abbott, 1988, p. 174; and Hopkins, Stanley and 
Hopkins, 1990, p. 293). These authors argue that by using a Likert scale, one can 
generate quantitative data on attitudes. This is achieved by constructing a set of both 
positive and negative statements and then directing the respondent to endorse the 
statement based on a given set of response options, typically strongly agree, agree, not 
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sure, disagree and strongly disagree. Depending on either the favourable or 
unfavourable position of the statement (either positive or negative) a numerical value 
is given. For example, responses marked strongly agree may be scaled with a value of 
five and progressively scaled to a score of one for strongly disagree. These 
quantitative data can then be used to estimate the attitudes of the respondents. 
Likert scales are not without disadvantages. Lewin ( 1979) highlights one problem by 
arguing that the response options may mean different things to different respondents. 
Lewin (1979, p. 163) states that" what does strongly approve as used in the Likert 
scale mean to Fred, as compared with what it means to Jack or Betty." For example, 
strongly approve to one respondent may lean more towards approve than it does for 
another who may indeed strongly approve of the statement. 
Another disadvantage of the Likert scale, as outlined by Lin (1976, p. 185) is that it 
does not give the respondents the opportunity to express the degree of intensity to 
which they feel they either agree or disagree. The Likert scale assumes that all 
responses given are done so with the same intensity. There is also the possibility, as 
Best (1981, p. 185) outlines, that people will mark the response option they think 
should be marked instead of that which they really believe. 
Thorndike eta!. (1988, p. 415) argue that a very significant problem with attitude 
scales is that "they operate purely on a verbal level. The individual doesn't do 
anything to back up his stated attitude." 
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While the Likert scale method does have disadvantages, there are a number of 
advantages in using such a scale. Lin (1976, p. 183) states that the Likert test method 
is general enough to be applied to a wide range of variables, therefore being suitable 
for the study. Dane (1990, p. 272) indicates that using a Likert scale is significantly 
less labour intensive and time consuming. Payne (1974, p. 189) argues that the 
attraction to the Likert scale is because it is less complex than other methods, but as 
Lewin (1979, p. 159) points out, the results derived from a Likert scale are just as 
accurate. This is because Likert himself completed the same stuUy using both the 
Thurstone and Likert methods and produced identical results. 
In developing a Likert test, Anderson (1988, p. 427) and Lin (1976, p. 184-185) 
believe that the following steps should be undertaken; 
(a) Construct statements which are both favourable and unfavourable. 
(b) Judges from a sample of the population going to test are used to determine 
whether the statements are favourable, unfavourable or neither. 
(c) Those statements not classified by the majority of the judges as either 
favourable or unfavourable are eliminated. 
(d) Remaining statements are presented in random order. 
(e) This initial version of the test is administererl to a sample population. 
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(f) The correlation between the total scores and the individual statements are 
computed. 
(g) Each statement whose correlation with the total score is not statistically 
significant may be eliminated. This procedure is referre~ to as Likert's 
criterion of internal consistency. 
(h) The final version of the test is prepared. 
These steps are included as they are necessary for the Likert test to be constructed 
correctly, in order for the best possible results to be achieved. 
Sampling 
Best (1981, p. 8) points out that the study of an entire population is impractical, if not 
impossible. Lin (1976, p. 146) states that a population is " ... the total group of cases 
which conform to certain designated set of specifications. In this case the populations 
involved are professional security people and people with no security expertise. As it 
is not possible to study the entire population, samples of the population must be used. 
A sample is a " ... small proportion of a population selected for observation and 
analysis" (Best, 1981, p.8). 
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As it is not the intention of the study to generalise with regards to the security decay 
theory across both the expert and non - expert security population, then nonprobability 
sample methods were judged sufficient. 
Lin (1976, p. 157) states that nonprobability sampling methods are suitable when 
generalisations of results across a population are not required. It is highlighted by Lin 
( 1976, p. 157) and Best ( 1981, p. 13) that nonprobability sampling methods will not 
produce results that can be attributable across the population, but will provide results 
that can only be generalised across the specific sample group. Lin (1976, p. 187) states 
that; 
"Nonprobability samples may be useful in providing the researcher with 
insight or a general idea of what is happening in the population, but they are 
not scientific reflections of the population itself." 
Lin ( 1976, p. 157) presents a number of nonprobability sampling methods of which 
"Purposive Sampling" was believed to be the most appropriate for the study. 
Lin (1976, p. 158) describes the purposive sampli•'g method as one which;" ... 
involves the use of judgement on the part of the researcher. He forms his sample by 
selecting cases he thinks are representative of the population." 
Purposive sampling is believed to be a viable sampling method when the boundaries 
of the population under examination are impossible to define and when time and 
facilities available are limited (Lin, 1976, p. 158). 
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In regards to sample size, it is argued by Lewin, (I 979, p. I 88) that a smaller 
population can be represented by a small sample, and that even though a population 
size may increase. the increase in the requisite sample size is not proportional. The 
population for this study is small, therefore a small sample size is sufficient. 
Validity 
Hopkins et al. (I 990), Zeller (I 988), Payne ( 1974) and Lewin (1979) all state that 
validity is a concept that relates to whether or not the study conducted actually 
measures what it intended to measure. For example, Lewin (1979) argues that;" A 
measure is valid if it really measures what it is supposed to measure." Shaughnessy 
and Zechmeister (1985, p. 15) point out that" ... validity refers to the truthfulness of a 
measure. A valid measure is one that measures what it claims to measure." 
Lewin (1979, p. 78) argues that one way of determining validity is by "face validity." 
Face validity refers to the self-evident nature of the validity of the test and may be 
gained through expert scrutineering of the test. 
Reliability 
Reliability refers to the consistency of the test. Lin (1976, p. 168) states that a measure 
will be reliable if it generates similar responses on every subsequent usage. Lewin 
(1979, p. 77) describes reliability as the extent to which the method of measurement 
produces the same results under the same conditions. 
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When discussing validity and reliability, one important point must be noted, a test 
method can be reliable, but not necessarily valid (Hopkins et al. 1990. p. 113; and 
Shaughnessy & Zechmeister, 1985, p. 15). An example to illustrate this point is given 
by Shaughnessy et al. (1985, p. 15) when they state that; 
" ... subjects whose intelligence was being tested might be able to perform 
consistently (reliably) on a balancing task, but there is serious questions about 
the validity of this measure of intelligence." 
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CHAPTER3 
The Study 
To thoroughly examine the concept of security decay, one would be required to 
conduct a longitudinal study which can be defined as the " ... examining of a 
population over a prolonged period of time" (Payne, 1974, p. 201). Such a 
longitudinal study could take the fonn of a researcher located within an organisation 
for a prolonged period of time and constantly assessing the effectiveness of security, 
degrees of apathy towards its provision and the effect that this has on the operational 
effectiveness of security. However, this investigation does not pennit a longitudinal 
study, therefore the gathering and assessment of the attitudes to specific aspects of the 
security decay theory were sought. 
Sample and Subject Selection 
The attitudes of two distinct samples were sought which include professional security 
specialists and non - security persons. This stratification of sample was required as the 
non- security person's represent those that are instructed, influenced and operate 
within the security guidelines. It is the non- security persons that will, if at all, 
become apathetic towards security. Therefore, the test concerned with whether or not 
effective security causes apathy will be directed at this sample. 
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It must be assumed that the security specialist will have an understanding of the 
security decay concept, how effective security functions and whether apathy will 
cause security to decay. This is because it is the security specialist who construct the 
security programs and monitor their effectiveness. 
It was believed that for the study, the nonprobability purposive sampling method 
would suffice. The population of what one may call a "security specialist" is 
ambiguous. There are people operating within the security field whose claim to expert 
status is not without some concern. There are people whose occupation requires them 
to conduct security, as well as other tasks and it is assumed that these people are not 
security specialists. With regards to non -security personnel, how does one define this 
population? As has already been stated, the security specialist population is 
ambiguous, so where is the line drawn discriminating the security expert from the 
ignorant? 
For the purposes of the study, a non -security person was defined as someone who 
has no direct responsibility for security and who is influenced or 'controlled' by 
security policy and procedure during the course of their daily routine business 
activities. 
The security specialist population consisted of those persons who have a direct 
responsibility for security, either in a managerial, consultative or advisory role. 
Formal security training and education was not a prerequisite where considerable 
experience was evident. 
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The purposive sampling method was used in the study, as it was believed that cases 
could be chosen from the population that would provide for an appropriate sample. As 
a result of this sampling method being used, it will not be argued that the attitudes 
evaluated will reflect those of the wider security and non- security populations. 
A security specialist sample size of around fifteen was deemed achievable and a 
similar non - security sample was also sought. 
Instrumentation 
The instrument used to assess the attitudes and perceptions from which interpretation 
could be made was in the form of a Likert test. Three Likert tests were constructed 
and administered to the specified sample groups where each test, Test 1 part A and B 
(Appendix A and B) and Test 2 (Appendix C) related to the three research questions. 
A positive or negative position (relative to the decay theory) was taken with each 
statement, with positive and negative statements being presented in a random order. A 
negative statement was one, which was in contradiction with the theory, and a positive 
statement was one, which was aligned with the theory. The negative or positive 
polarities of these statements will determine the numerical ratings for each item. 
The response options of strongly agree, agree, not sure, disagree and strongly disagree 
were utilised. The number scale ranged from 5-1 (on a positively framed statement) 
and from 1 - 5 (on a negatively framed statement). For example, if the statement was 
positive, then strongly agree would equal 5, agree would equal4, not sure would equal 
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3 and so on. Therefore, the higher the numerical value, the more the attitude is one of 
agreement. 
Procedure 
The three Likert tests were developed so that a pilot study could be conducted. Upon 
completing the construction of the Likert tests (before they were distributed to the 
pilot sample), validity of the tests was evaluated. 
Validity of the Likert test statements was examined through the face validity me.hod. 
Associate Professor Cliff Smith conducted the examination and came to the 
conclusion that the tests would satisfactorily fulfil their functional requirements and 
had face validity for their proposed function and application (Appendix D). 
Upon completing the validation process, the pilot study was then conducted. 
Pilot Study 
The Security Specialist Test (Test I) Part A consisted of 47 statements and Part B 
consisted of 12 statements. These two tests were completed by three people from the 
security specialist sample. 
The Security Effectiveness Test (Test 2) consisted of 17 statements. This test was 
completed by three people who matched the description of non- security people. 
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As a result of the low number of respondents completing the pilot study. the ability to 
accurately assess each statement was reduced. However those statements which did 
not appear to be consistent were identifiable. This was achieved by summing the total 
score for each statement, and those statements with a score which was extremely 
dissimilar to the others was eliminated. 
Also, those statements eliciting a variety of responses (for example, responses of both 
strongly agree and strongly disagree), it will be argued in the majority of cases, could 
be justifiably included in the final test version. A small number of statements elicited 
varying responses and were eliminated as a result of this scrutiny. 
A discussion of the pilot study results will be presented, with the results of the pilot 
study in Appendix E. 
Security Specialist Test- Test 1 (Part A) 
Test 1 (Part A) was developed to attempt to evaluate what may constitute an effective 
security program. 
Below is an outline of those statements which warranted further analysis before they 
were either eliminated or used in the final test version. Those statements that did not 
warrant further analysis will not be discussed. 
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Statement 3 : The responses to this statement were extreme enough to warrant 
further analysis. However are- wording of the statement would 
modify it to a point that would justify its inclusion in the final 
version of the test. The statement included the word vital; that a 
certain function is 'vital' to effective security. A response of 
disagree was brought about because of the strong nature of this 
word. The word 'vital' was changed to the word 'important'. 
Statement 7 : Although there was a variation in response options chosen 
(two SD, one A), this statement was included in the final test 
version as it was thought that the statement was misinterpreted in 
the pilot study. However, the statement was re-phrased to provide 
clarity of intent to the test subjects. 
Statement 9 : There was a variation in response options chosen for this statement 
due to a misinterpretation. The statement was re - phrased to provide 
clarity. 
Statement l 0 : This statement was thought to be misinterpreted. The statement was 
fairly long and as a result, was re - phrased. 
Statement 16: This statement was classified as a positive statement which elicitt!d 
all negative responses. This resulted in an inconsistent statement 
score and was therefore removed from the final test version. 
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Statement 18 : This statement elicited responses of agree, disagree and not 
sure. However instead of eliminating it from the final test 
version, it was presented as two separate statements. 
Statement 19: This statement was misinterpreted and subsequently resulted in a 
modification of the statement. 
Statement 26 : This statement was also misinterpreted. However this statement was 
necessary in ensuring that the aim of the test was achieved. 
Statement 33 : Although three different response options were chosen, (with two 
leaning towards agreement), and because of the small number of 
pilot study participants, it was thought that such a circumstance 
should result in the statement being included in the final test 
version. 
Statement 35 : Although one response option was Not Sure (NS), the others 
indicated a degree of agreement. For this reason the statement was 
included in the final test version. 
Statement 42 : This statement was misinterpreted but the subject matter of this 
statement was needed to be included. This resulted in the statement 
being re - phrased and included in the final test version. 
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Statement 47 : The responses indicated that this statement was poorly constructed. 
Although it was included in the final test, extensive modification 
was undertaken to alleviate respondent's difficulties. 
Security Effectiveness Test- Test 2 
Test 2 was develc.ped in order to examine whether the respondents thought that 
effective security was achievable, that this state of security would cause a lack of 
security incidence, and that an environment lacking in security breaches would cause 
decay. 
Statement 3 : 
Statement 7 : 
This statement was designed with positive polarity. However it 
elicited negative responses. This made it inconsistent and resulted in 
its removal for the final version of the test. 
Although this statement elicited varying responses, this statement is 
of considerable importance to the study. The statement is concise 
and modification will bring about no benefit. For this reason, the 
statement was included in the final version of the test. 
Statement 12 : This statement was inconsistent as a result of its positive 
construction and negative response, and was therefore eliminated. 
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Security Specialist Test- Test 1 (Part B) 
This test was developed in order to assess the security specialist respondent's 
perceptions towards whether or not apathetic attitudes to security would cause security 
to decay, or reduce in effectiveness. 
Statement 2 : This statement was misinterpreted but because of its critical 
importance to the study, it was included in the final test version. 
As a result of the pilot study, there were three omissions of statements with statement 
16 in the Security Specialists Test- Test I part A, and statements 3 and 12 in The 
Security Effectiveness Test- Test 2. There were also a number of modifications of 
statements that were included in the final version of the test. 
The pilot study was a valuable facet of the study as it allowed those statements that 
were unsuitable for whatever reasons, to be evaluated and either modified or 
eliminated. 
Reliability of the Likert tests was addressed through the conducting of the pilot study. 
The pilot study allowed any inconsistent statements to be omitted. Statements were 
deemed inconsistent when their total score varied significantly from other statement 
scores. Upon completion of the pilot study, three statements were omitted as their 
scores varied significantly. 
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After the pilot study, the final version tests were developed, with the appropriate 
modifications made. As the final test versions were being developed, the researcher 
identified those people who would be suitable and likely to be willing to participate in 
the study. These people were identified through professional security management 
societies. 
The respondent's chosen were contacted by telephone to detennine if they were 
willing to participate. The majority of participants contacted agreed to participate, and 
arrangements were made to either visit them at their place of work to complete the 
tests, or to mail or facsimile the test to them. This procedure required them to return 
the test through similar means. 
The targeted participants were those representing the security specialist sample. In 
order to collect completed tests from the non- security sample, certain members of the 
security specialist sample were requested to pass on the Security Effectiveness Test-
Test 2, to people within their organisation who had no direct security responsibility, 
but were influenced by security initiatives. This allowed for easier access to both 
subjects and ensured that those completing the test were in fact influenced by security 
initiatives. 
With the final version tests completed and returned, the data analysis phase of the 
study commenced. 
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Data Analysis 
The data were analysed in a four part process, with each of the three individual test 
results being outlined and interpreted, and then being discussed in relation to the 
theory as a whole. This four step process resulted from each test addressing one of the 
variables of the section of the security decay theory under examination. Each variable 
had to be assessed individually, before being assessed in relation to the theory. 
The Security Specialist Test- Test l examined the concept of effective security and as 
such, was divided into specific categories (called sub- concepts) for analysis. This 
was done as an effective security program will consist of many elements. Effective 
security may include some aspects and not others, therefore each was highlighted 
individually. 
The Security Effectiveness Test- Test 2 focused on the relationship between effective 
security and apathy and it)oo required categorical analysis. The reason why this test 
was divided into sub - concepts was because each sub - concept had to be present 
before the other could be attributed. That is, if the respondents did not believe 
effective security was achievable, then they could not have thought effective security 
would cause a lack of security incidents. 
The third test, the Security Specialist Test- Test 1 Part B was concerned solely on 
whether or not apathy will cause a reduction in effectiveness and therefore no further 
categorisation was required. 
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For each test, and those tests requiring categorical analysis, the summated sub -
concept mean score was given, as well as total concept mean scores. This process 
allowed the prevailing attitude from within the sample population to be considered. 
Following the outlining of the study results, analysis and outcome detenninations 
were undertaken which addressed each of the test results and how they related to the 
security decay theory. 
Limitations 
A limitation of the study is the inability to generalise outcomes, which is a result of 
the sampling method utilised. The attitudes assessed in the study will not necessarily 
reflect those of the broader security and non -security population. This limitation can 
be overcome by conducting representative random sampling, as well as collecting a 
larger sample size, which was not fe,sible for this study. It was deemed sufficient to 
collect a representative sample, which would provide an indication of the prevailing 
attitude within both populations. 
Another limitation of the study is that it provides no proof that effective security is 
achievable or that effective security will cause apathy and that apathy will cause 
decay. That is, there will be no conclusive evidence supporting the hypothesis. To be 
able to demonstrate evidence of the existence or lack of existence of security decay, a 
longitudinal study must be undertaken. 
43 
Security Decay : The erosion of effective security 
Also the Security Specialist Test - Test l, will not provide a theoretical basis for ao 
evaluation of whether security is effective or not; that is, one could not argue that 
effective security specifically consists of the concepts under examination in the test. 
The concepts are present in the test solely because they were included by the 
researcher, and would not constitute all factors necessary for security to be effective. 
Add to this the notion that security is a very flexible phenomenon and what may 
indeed be effective at one facility may not at another. This results from a multitude of 
factors including facility location, industry type, crime demographics, business 
operations of neighbouring facilities and so on. Ultimately, each facility will have 
differing levels of risk exposure, requiring differing levels of security. Therefore, the 
Security Specialist Test- Test 1 will only provide an indication as to what may be 
included in an effective security program. 
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CHAPTER4 
Study Results 
The measurement process consisted of three Likert tests. A Likert test (Security 
Specialist Test- Test I part A) was administered to the security specialist sample, 
addressing the research question, What constitutes effective security? Thus the total 
concept score for this test relates to what constitutes effective security. 
This test was also divided into a number of categories that represent aspects within a 
security function that may enable security to become, if implemented and 
implemented correctly, effective. The sub- concepts included; 
(a) Management of the Security Function 
(b) Awareness I Education 
(c) Application of Security Theory 
(d) fuvestigation I futelligence 
(e) Measuring Effectiveness 
(f) Legal Aspects 
(g) Professi.'}:,~lism of rhe Security Manager 
Each of these sub - concepts were tested, enabling a sub concept score to be 
determined. This sub - concept score enabled the sub - concept to be analysed, and 
then assessed in relation to the total concept. 
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The second Likert test (Security Effectiveness Test- Test 2) was administered to the 
non - security sample addressing the research question; Does effective security cause 
an attitude of apathy towards the provision of security? This test was also divided into 
sub - concepts and included; 
(a) Effective security is an achievable state 
(b) Effective security causes a lack of security incidence 
(c) A lack of security incidence causes apathy 
This categorisation was necessary as to gauge the respondents' attitude to this 
concept, the respondents attitude towards whether effective security is achievable had 
to be detennined, as well as whether or not this causes a lack of security incidents, 
resulting in apathy. 
The third Likert test (Security Specialist Test- Test I part B) was also administered to 
the security specialist sample addressing the research question; Does an apathetic 
attitude towards the provision of security cause a decaying of security? This research 
question consisted of the only concept under examination within this test 
Security Specialist Test - Test 1 Part A 
The sub- concept and total concept mean scores for the Security Specialist Test- Test 
I Part A are as follows; 
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I Man~gement of the security 
functmn 
I Awareness I Education 
I Application of Security Theory 
I Investigation I Intelligence 
I Measuring Effectiveness 
I Legal Aspects 
Professionalism of the Security 
Manager 
I Total Concept Score 
4.23 
4.53 
4.33 
3.76 
4.53 
4.58 
4.18 
4.30 
Table 1: Sub- concept and Total concept scores for Security Specialist Test- Test I Part A 
The 'management of the security function' sub - concept consisted of numerous 
management issues such as risk management, financial aspects, the management of 
people, technology and infonnation and the management of the integration of security 
into the organisation. The mean score (N; 15) for this sub- concept (4.23) resided 
between agree (numerical value of 4) and strongly agree (numerical value of 5), 
indicating that the respondents believed that management considerations such as those 
included are of significant importance. 
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The 'awareness and education' sub- concept highlighted the importance of educating 
and communicating the security message. The mean score for this sub- concept (4.53) 
resided between agree and strongly agree which indicates that awareness and 
education programs should be included for security to be effective. 
The mean score for the 'application of security theory' sub- concept (4.33) resided 
between agree and strongly agree, indicating that when ensuring security is effective, 
one should consider applying relevant security theory. 
The sub- concept mean score for 'investigation I intelligence' (3.76) resided between 
not sure (numerical value of 3) and agree (numerical value of 4). This would indicate 
that the respondents were indecisive as to the importance of these to a security 
function. This may have resulted from the combining of the two into one concept, as 
some of the respondents may have thought one was important and the other not so. 
This may also have resulted from the respondent's personal use of investigations and 
intelligence, or lack thereof. 
The 'measuring effectiveness' sub- concept was concerned with the need to set a 
measure of effectiveness for security, that security must have a criterion on which to 
judge its perfonnance. The mean score for this sub- concept (4.53) resided between 
agree and strongly agree indicating that the respondents agreed with the need to set an 
effectiveness standard. 
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The sub- concept mean score for 'legal aspects' (4.58) resided between agree and 
strongly agree. This would suggest that the respondents agreed with the need to take 
into consideration legal aspects when providing an effective security function. 
The sub - concept 'professionalism of the security manager' was concerned with the 
levels of integrity a security manager must uphold, including their personal history. 
The mean score for this sub- concept (4.18) resided between agree and strongly agree, 
indicating the respondent's agreement with such levels of professionalism 
Each sub- concept is to be equally weighted, with no sub- concept being more 
important than the other. A summated combination of these sub- concepts resulted in 
the total concept score. The total concept score (4.30) resided between agree and 
strongly agree indicating that the respondents believe the sub- concepts will be 
necessary elements of an effective security program. 
Security Effectiveness Test- Test 2 
The sub -concept and total concept mean scores for the Security Effectiveness Test-
Test 2 are as follows; 
Effective security is an achievable 
state 
Effective security causes a lack of 
security incidence 
A lack of security incidence causes 
apathy 
3.92 
3.69 
3.26 
49 
Security Decay: The erosion of effective security 
I Total Concept Score 3.62 
Table 2: Sub- concept and Total concept scores for Security Effectiveness Test- Test 2 
The first sub -concept under examination within this test posed the question; is 
effective security an achievable state? The mean score (N = 12) for this sub- concept 
(3.92) resided between not sure and agree, leaning towards agree however. This result 
would suggest the respondents were indecisive with this sub -concept, however one 
may argue that they believe, albeit tentatively, that security can reach an effective 
state. 
The sub -concept concerned with whether effective security causes a lack of security 
incidence resulted in a mean score between not sure and agree (3.69). This would 
suggest that the respondents were not sure as to whether this would be the case or not. 
The third sub- concept within this test focused upon whether the respondents thought 
that a lack of security incidence causes an attitude of apathy. The mean score for the 
sub- concept (3.26) resided between not sure and agree. The indication therefore is 
that the respondents were unsure as to whether an environment where there was little 
or no threat occurrence would result in one becoming apathetic. 
The total concept score (3.62) resided between not sure and agree. The overriding 
indication is that the respondents were indecisive to this concept. It could be argued 
that the respondents were either unsure as to whether effective security causes a lack 
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of security incidence and that a lack of security incidence causes an attitude of apathy. 
Therefore the respondents did not disagree with these possibilities, nor did they agree, 
which in effect, provides inconclusive data. 
Security Specialist Test • Test 1 Part B 
The total concept score for the Security Specialist Test- Test 1 Part B is as follows; 
I Apathy causes decay 4.31 
I Total Concept Score 4.31 
Table 3 : Total concept scores for Security Specialist Test - Test I Part A 
There was only one concept under examination within this test. The mean score for 
the concept (4.31) resided between agree and strongly agree indicating that the 
respondents believe that an attitude of apathy towards the provision of security will 
cause security to decay. 
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CHAPTERS 
Analysis and Interpretations 
From the test results presented in the previous chapter, the analysis and interpretations 
phase will now follow. Each of the three tests and their sub- concepts (where 
applicable) will be analysed and interpreted, with the aim of providing an indication 
as to relevance and likelihood of the existence of the security decay theory. 
Security Specialist Test- Test I Part A 
All of the sub -concepts within the Security Specialist Test- Test 1 Part A would 
appear to be important to a security function striving for effectiveness. Although no 
weighting was given to the sub -concepts during development and testing, each 
derived reasonably similar mean scores (except for the investigation I intelligence sub 
-concept). This result would suggest that the implementing and managing of an 
effective security function requires the inclusion of many varied elements, providing a 
synergistic effect. 
While this may indeed be true, is one sub- concept more significant than another 
when providing an effective security function? An assessment of the mean scores 
shows that the 'legal aspects' sub- concept derived the highest score (4.58) from 
within the sample, but is this deserving of the highest score? Ensuring compliance 
with legislation, documenting policy and procedures and reducing the likelihood of 
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negligence suits are all legal issues which must certainly be addressed, but if one was 
to state security's core business, would legal compliance be it? 
Within the 'management of the security function' sub - concept were issues such as; 
integrating security's influence into all organisational departments, financial 
management of the security function, managing the relevance of people, technology 
and information, and risk management. 
The researcher would argue that it is risk management that will 'represent' a security 
function's core business and therefore, will be of the greatest significance. Although 
the 'management of the security function' sub - concept derived a lower mean score 
than others, this could be attributed to the merging of the integration, financial, 
technology, people and infonnation issues into the sub- concept. In order for the sub-
concept to receive a high mean score, all respondents would needed to have strongly 
agreed with all issues, and one could argue that the greater the number of issues 
within a sub- concept, the less likely it is that one would agree significantly with it. 
The statements within the 'management of the security function' sub- concept 
concerned directly with risk management produced results, which can be seen in 
Table 4. 
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Statement Mean Score 
1. 4.73 
2. 4.80 
3. 4.67 
4. 4.20 
5. 4.47 
6. 4.47 
7. 4.00 
9. 4.53 
10. 4.00 
16. 4.27 
17. 3.80 
18. 3.67 
Table 4: Mean statement scores for statements relating to risk management within the 'management of 
the security function' sub - concept. 
The summated mean score for risk management relevant statements was 4.30. This 
score resides between agree and strongly agree indicating that the respondents believe 
that risk management is an important component of effective security. However 
compared with other sub- concepts, it ranks relatively low. The reason for this would 
appear to have resulted from the low mean scores for statements 17 and 18. 
Statement 17 reads as " a security function which reduces identified threat 
consequence will be deemed effective" and statement 18 reads as "a security function 
which reduces identified threat frequency will be deemed effective." There would 
appear to be indecision as to the importance of reducing threat frequency and 
consequence from within the sample. The researcher would argue that for security to 
be effective, threat frequency must be reduced, as well as the consequences of any 
threat occurrence. It is possible that some of the respondents did not take the 
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statement at face value; that is, they read more into the statement than was expected. 
Yes a security program which only reduces threat frequency will not be effective, but 
the statements were not referring to frequency or consequence in isolation. 
The reason why risk management should be the over riding factor in ensuring a 
security function is effective is because of the role a security function is tasked to 
perform. Security's role is to reduce the level of risk an organisation is exposed to, via 
numerous methods, to a level which the organisation is willing to accept. The !isk 
management process, which can be argued to include the following components; asset 
identification, threat identification, vulnerability assessment, risk analysis (threat 
consequence multiplied by probability), risk treatment options and treatment option 
implementation and review, will allow the security function to specifically identify 
those risks which are not acceptable, and effectively and efficiently reduce their 
probability of occurrence and consequence. 
Indeed Elbra (1992) highlights the importance of risk management when outlining the 
options in which a security function could operate. Elbra ( 1992, p. 27) argues that 
there are four basic approaches to security which are; 
- to invest all the security devices that are available 
- habitually react to the latest scare 
- to patch up holes as they appear or; 
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to carry out a risk management exercise. 
It is obvious that the first three methods alone do not provide for an efficient and 
effective security program, as Elbra (1992, p. 27) states" ... the result [would] be 
islands of security in a sea of risk." Only through the practicing of risk management 
can security expenditure be consumed effectively and efficiently. 
Risk management however is not often utilised, or when utilised, is done so 
incorrectly. Keller (1994, p. 104) in discussing how much security is sufficient within 
a museum environment, stated that; " ... all that security professionals can do is make 
an educated guess based on experience." However, the practicing of risk management 
involves more than merely making guesses based on experience. While experience 
will significantly aid in the accuracy of any assessment and decision making, the 
results of a risk assessment are derived from statistics, qualitative data such as 
emerging crime trends and historical reports and the understanding of such issues as 
cultural influences and heuristical biases. 
The practice of risk management however is not without criticism. Toft (1997, p. 85) 
states that; 
" .... risk management [to some] can be envisaged as being similar to 
soothsaying and prophecy; in so far as the general idea is to forecast what 
potential misfortunes the future might hold for the organisation and then try to 
prevent them from occurring." 
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The foundation for this criticism lies in the idea that risk management does not deal in 
the absolute, but in possibilities and likelihoods. Being able to predict the future is 
indeed a difficult task, and while this criticism does exist, the relevance of risk 
management to the provision of an effective security function must be argued to reside 
in the efficiencies it allows. 
Risk management will be the management tool on which the security program is 
planned and developed. While its practice is of ultimate importance, it can only be 
effective when combined with other factors. 
The implementation of the risk management process will result in the security 
manager being able to report to senior management the level of risk exposure, but how 
is this level of exposure to be reduced to an acceptable level? The level of risk 
exposure is reduced by outlining recommended treatment options to senior 
management, who will proceed to evaluate each and determine which are to be 
implemented. But what do the treatment options consist of? 
The treatment options are exhaustive and consist of any countermeasure or any 
process modification that will reduce risk consequence and I or probability. Indeed, 
treatment options can consist of the sub- concepts within the Security Specialist Test 
- Test I Part A. 
In recommending treatment options and developing security countermeasure plans, it 
would appear necessary to apply security theory. This is supported by the 'application 
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of security theory' sub - concept which derived a high score ( 4.33). A security theory 
may provide the manager with a greater insight into the problem, or may allow them 
to address the problem in a way that has been proven to work in the past. For example, 
the implementing of various countermeasures giving consideration to the defence in 
depth principle. 
Vlith a risk assessment completed and countermeasures implemented, the security 
function will not automatically become effective. There will be an ongoing need to 
'sell' the security function to the organisation because of personnel turnover and 
emerging threats (Sennewald, 1985, p. 241). Also, and as Sennewald (1985, p. 241) 
states; 
.. Employees at all levels of the organisation must first be made aware of, then 
understand, and then come to appreciate the fact that the security function is a 
viable and integral part of the business ... " 
This can only be achieved through constant awareness programs and education 
initiatives. The sub- concept relating to this within the Security Specialist Test- Test 
I Part A derived a very high score (4.53), indicating that the respondents agree with 
the importance of such programs in an effective security function. 
Does a security function need to undergo a process of self evaluation to become and I 
or remain effective? The 'measuring effectiveness' sub- concept derived a very high 
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score (4.53) indicating that the respondents did indeed believe so. But how does the 
security function measure effectiveness? 
One possible way to measure effectiveness is through benchmarking. O'Leary (1995, 
p. 25) defines benchmarking as" ... the process of continuously measuring and 
assessing products, services and practices against recognised standards." However the 
problem faced in benchmarking a security function, is recognising a standard on 
which to compare. One may be tempted to compare the results of one year with years 
past, but will this provide a legitimate comparison? The operating environment is so 
dynamic that the level of risk faced one year may be significantly greater or less from 
previous years. 
The researcher would argue, that in order to measure effectiveness, the security 
function must first set objectives which are attainable based on the current 
environment and then, after some determinable period of time, evaluate whether the 
objectives have been achieved. These objectives may be categorised into financial 
objectives, levels of satisfaction of security by staff and management and so forth. 
Those who are tasked with ensuring the security of the organisation are placed in 
positions of great trust. Therefore the integrity of the security manager must be of the 
highest order. Not only that, but the security manager must have a high degree of 
knowledge and some relevant experience for security to be effective. The security 
manager must understand the philosophy of security and all its intricacies. Therefore, 
one could argue that the professionalism of the security manager is of some 
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importance. For security to be effective, it must be respected by the organisation, and 
this is likely to be more forth coming if the security manager him I her self is 
respected. The 'professionalism of the security manager' sub- concept derived a 
reasonably high score (4.18), suggesting that the respondents agree with this need. 
The 'investigation I intelligence' sub- concept provided the most surprising sub -
concept mean score (3.76), residing between not sure and agree. There was in effect, 
two concepts under examination in relation to investigations and intelligence. Firstly, 
whether they were necessary in effective security programs, and secondly how they 
related to pro - activeness and reactiveness. 
Statements 26 and 42 were concerned with the importance of investigations to an 
effective security program, deriving mean scores of 3.80 and 3.93. This would suggest 
that the sample were unsure, although leaning towards agreement. 
Statements 43 and 45 were concerned with the importance of security intelligence, 
deriving mean scores of 4.40 and 4.20, indicating that the respondents do consider 
intelligence to be of some significance when attempting to achieve a state of effective 
security. 
When combining investigations and intelligence to issues of pro - activeness and 
reactiveness, the sample were again indecisive. Statement 27 argued that intelligence 
will provide the necessary proactive element of an effective security program and 
derived a mean score of 3.60. Statement 35 argued that investigations will provide the 
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necessary reactive element in an effective security program, deriving a mean score of 
just 2.60, which resides between disagree (2) and not sure (3). 
The researcher believes that it is the wording of statement 35 which resulted in the 
low sub- concept mean score. It would be argued that investigations provide 'a' 
reactive element in a security program, not 'the' reactive element. It is believed that 
the respondents read the statement correctly, but that is was poorly worded and not 
discovered in the pilot study. 
The researcher would argue that for security to be effective, it must provide both 
proactive and reactive capabilities. An inherent concept of the defence in depth 
principle is redundancy. In order to provide sufficient redundancy, the security 
function must be able to both prevent risk rnaterialisation as well as reacting to it. As 
the elimination of security risk is unattainable, we provide infrastructures that wili 
manage the crisis. Also, often upon risk materialisation, an investigation is 
commissioned to determine the how and the why, and recommend ways to prevent the 
event from occurring in the future. These capabilities are examples of reactionary 
elements of a security function. 
The most effective way of being proactive is to forward plan, to recognise events that 
may occur and develop ways in which to either prevent their frequency and I or 
consequence. In order to forward plan, infonnation must be coiiected and evaluated. 
Information which has been evaluated is known as inteiligence and intelligence is an 
important security tool because of the influence it has over planning and decision 
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making. Indeed "intelligence deals with all things which should be known in advance 
of initiating a course of action" (Eells and Nehemkis, 1984, p. 48). Intelligence will 
provide the security manager with the information needed to make the most timely 
and relevant recommendations to senior management, before an event occurs. 
Therefore, should the security function strive for both reactive and proactive elements, 
the researcher would argue that investigation and intelligence capabilities would fulfil 
these roles. However, the data fails to support this argument conclusively. 
Security Effectiveness Test - Test 2 
The results of the Security Effectiveness Test- Test 2 were generally inconclusive, 
with the three sub- concepts all deriving mean scores between not sure and agree, 
resulting in a similar total concept mean score (See Table 2). 
The first concept put to the non - security sample was whether or not they believed 
that effective security was an achievable state. To this they responded with a mean 
score of 3.92 suggesting they were unsure, however leaning towards believing that 
security could be effective. 
So is effective security achievable? The researcher would argue in the affirmative 
because of the plan that a correctly conducted risk management process will allow one 
to develop. Such a process allows one to accurately assess threat types, frequencies 
and consequences and therefore implement countermeasures to negctte these. The risk 
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management process combined with new technologies and traditional management 
practices all allow security to achieve a state of effectiveness. 
The second concept put to the non -security sample was whether they believed that 
effective seculity would cause a lack of security incidents. The mean score for this sub 
-concept was 3.69, again demonstrating some indecision and ignorance from this 
sample. It was argued previously that effective security will result when numerous 
factors are integrated with the practicing of risk management in order for threat 
occurrences to be reduced in both frequency and consequence. Therefore, if security is 
effective, a reduction in incidents (frequency) will result. 
The final sub- concept put to the non- security sample was whether a lack of security 
incidents causes an attitude of apathy towards the provision of security. This sub-
concept derived a mean score of 3.26, suggesting that the respondents were not sure if 
this situation would arise or not. 
There were a number of ways in which the statements were put to the respondents 
within this sub -concept. Some of the statements were directed at the respondents 
themselves, and were then combined with concepts of perceptions of unnecessariness 
towards security and experiences of security incidents. 
Statements 4 and 8 were directed at the respondents themselves and stated (with 
different polarities) that when the respondents perceive security as unnecessary, they 
do not follow security policy and procedure. Both of these statements resulted in mean 
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scores of 2.42, indicating that they disagree with this. Therefore, the respondents 
believe that even though they may perceive security as unnecessary, they still comply 
will all procedures. Whether or not this would be reflective of the wider population is 
indeterminable. 
The statements directed at the respondents themselves which dealt with the influence 
a lack of security breaches experienced, had over their degree of apathy (statements 12 
and 15) resulted in mean scores of 3.58 and 3.67. These mean scores suggest that the 
respondents were indecisive as to whether or not their experiences of security 
breaches influenced their degree of apathy. That is, the respondents could not decide 
whether or not circumstances where they do not experience security breaches resulted 
in them feeling apathetic towards security. The data from within the sample is 
therefore inconclusive. 
The researcher would argue however that if one does not experience a security 
incident and is surrounded with security procedures, one would be likely to consider 
the security irrelevant, thereby becoming apathetic. The theory and the researcher's 
opinion are by no means arguing that this is the proper way to view security. The fact 
that no incidents are occurring is because of the existence of security and it therefore 
should be maintained. However the non - security people do not comprehend this (in 
theory), making it the task of the security function to highlight andre- enforce the 
need for security. 
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Security Specialist Test- Test I Part B 
There was only one concept under examination within this test. This concept was 
concerned with whether or not apathy would cause a decaying or an erosion of 
security effectiveness. The summated mean score for this concept was 4.31, indicating 
that the respondents did indeed believe that apathetic attitudes towards security, by 
people within an organisation, would cause security to decay. 
This concept is primarily concerned with the issues of compliance and the reliance of 
security initiatives on organisational personnel. Staff compliance with security 
procedure is of paramount importance to a security function and one could argue that 
without it, security will decay. This process is because of the nature of security itself. 
A security function can only identify risks, develop plans to counter the risk, 
implement the plan and review effectiveness. The security function can only provide a 
guide, recommending ways to achieve a secure state. The security function may 
indeed be able to force its message in other environments such as prisons and the 
military, but generally not within the private sector. 
It is the staff who require access to company spaces, it is the staff who handle monies 
or valuable product and it is the staff who are trusted with confidential infonnation. In 
effect, all staff are empowered with the responsibility of being company security 
officers. For security to be effective, it must be a collaborative effort between those 
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who are responsible for guiding the security function, the security manager and 
subordinates, and those who must provide the actual security, the staff. 
H the staff perceive security as irrelevant, the collaborative effort is broken, the 
security function will in effect be rendered inoperable, and security may decay. 
Analysis Summary 
To summarize the results, one could argue that effective security will be created 
through a synergistic combination of many elements including, but not limited to, 
those contained in the Security Specialist Test- Test 1 Part A. The elements to an 
effective security function will be application specific, with the over riding element of 
an effective security program being the risk management process as this will represent 
a security functions core business. With elements identified and implemented, one can 
argue that effective security is achievable. 
The data from the non - security sample regarding whether they believe effective 
security will cause apathy was inconclusive. Therefore, one can not rule out such an 
effect, nor attribute apathy to effective security. The study can make no generalisable 
detennination regarding this concept. 
The security specialist respondents believed that apathetic attitudes towards security 
would cause security to decay. This would provide a fairly strong indication with 
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regards to this concept, however and again, no generalisable determination can be 
made. 
The likelihood and relevance of the security decay theory can be viewed in an 
assessment of the component variables. 
Is an organisation likely to be able to achieve a state of effective security? Through the 
practicing of risk management and with the implementation of various 
countermeasure strategies an organsiation will indeed be able to achieve a state of 
effective security. 
Does a state of effective security cause apathy through the prevention of security 
breaches? The results of this study do not allow for a conclusive detennination, 
however one may argue that this is indeed likely because effective security will reduce 
risk materialisation. With no risk materialisation and combined with factors such as 
risk perception, heuristical biases and cultural influences, people may believe that 
there is no need for such a level of security, which in turn, influences their degree of 
compliance with security policy and procedure. 
Does an attitude of apathy towards the provision of security cause a decaying of 
security? The indication to be derived from the study was that apathy would indeed 
cause security effectiveness to decay. 
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Therefore the researcher would argue that security decay within an organisation is 
likely and therefore relevant. 
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CHAPTER6 
Recommendations and Implications 
Recommendations 
There are a number of recommendations to be made resulting from the study. They are 
primarily concerned with the further exploration of the security decay theory. 
The results of this investigation were reasonably restricted, providing in a number of 
cases conclusive results which are however un- generalisable, and in other cases, 
providing generally inconclusive results. 
The first recommendation is for the theory as a whole to be scrutinised under a 
longitudinal study. It is envisaged that such a study would be inherently complex, 
involving accurate assessments of attitudes mwards security and how they may vary 
over time. Also and in doing this, examining the factors which are influencing these 
attitudes. If such a study were to be successful, it would provide the security manager 
with invaluable infonnation which would allow him I her to address the problem at 
the cause. 
The study did not address the security decay theory in its entirety. In further 
exploration of the theory, the way in which management reacts to threat 
materialisation needs to be examined. It is postulated that when decay is evident, 
69 
Security Decay : The erosion of effective security 
management often react with an over emphasis of security. This results because either 
they are not heeding the advice of the risk assessor, or they are interpreting the risk 
data incorrectly. 
When security decay's, the amount of residual risk may increase, however the original 
level of risk exposure may or may not change. This is because the implemented 
countermeasures have reduced the risk exposure to a level that the organisation is 
willing to accept. That risk which remains is residual risk and when a vulnerability 
such as decay arises, the countermeasures reduce in effectiveness, therefore causing 
the amount of residual risk to increase. The level of risk exposure will only change 
when a factor within the external environment changes, or when the internal 
vulnerability is so severe as to cause an increase in the level of risk exposure. It is 
recommended that the reaction to risk materialisation be studied, taking into account 
the various reasons resulting in a need to react and how that reaction influences both 
residual risk and risk exposure. 
Another recommendation is concerned with the need to develop security theory which 
is applicable. Gale (1994) in discussing the value added role of security stated that; 
"For while it may be interesting and even thought- provoking to construct an 
abstract model, managers must be able to use the model in pragmatic contexts 
and be assured that the results will indeed be beneficial." 
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The security decay theory is a long way from extending beyond being an abstract 
model, however this must be the primary goal in conducting further research. The 
results from this study suggest that at least certain elements of the security decay 
theory appear to be valid, which will provide a starting block towards the generation 
of an applicable model. 
Implications for Security Specialists 
Security managers, consultants and advisers must be aware of the ramifications of 
having effective security. While effective security is to be the objective, ensuring it 
remains effective requires constant review. Although there is no firm data to support 
the hypothesis (the respondents in this study were unsure), it is postulated by the 
security decay theory that effective security may result in attitudes of apathy towards 
security. This should be taken into consideration when reacting to threat occurrence. If 
not, a level of protection could be implemented which is both unnecessary and 
expensive. 
An unexpected implication of the study arises from the inconclusive results derived 
from the non- security sample. The fact that the respondents from within this sample 
were unsure as to all sub - concepts highlights the ignorance of security by those 
people who are not tasked with providing it. The need for continual awareness and 
education programs becomes apparent as a result of these findings. Awareness and 
education programs will not only aid in heightening the awareness of security's role, 
but it should, if carried out correctly, reduce apathy towards security. 
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CHAPTER7 
Conclusion 
The discipline of security lacks formal conceptual tools which can be used by security 
managers, advisers and consultants when attempting to provide effective security. 
This is because of security's relative age as a discipHne, it is still being developed. 
Many technological, socio!ogical and psychological theories can be applied to a 
security function, while other theories such as Defence in Depth and CPTED have 
been developed with security as a frame of reference. 
The aim of the study was to contribute to the security discipline by taking 
Underwood's (1989) idea of security decay and formalising and exploring it. This was 
achieved by outlining the security decay theory and in part, testing people's attitude 
towards it. 
The security decay theory is primarily concerned with the infi\Jence apathy has on 
security and how management react to risk materialisation when decay is evident. The 
study focused on the first of these. two components. There are a number of variables 
within the section of the theory that was under examination which include; effective 
security, the prevention of threat occurrence, apathy and decay. The variables 
represent a linear process as presented and each variable must be present before the 
other can be attributed. 
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Each of these variables were addressed in one of three Likert tests. The Likert test 
instrument allows the respondents to indicate their level of agreement with the 
statement presented to them, and when combining response options chosen with 
recognised numerical values, one is able to determine their attitude relative to the 
concept under examination. 
A Likert test (Security Specialist Test- Test I Part A) was administered to a security 
specialist sample and addressed the question; What constitutes effective security? A 
second Likert test (Security Effectiveness Test- Test 2) was administered to non-
security people addressing the question; Does effective security cause an attitude of 
apathy towards the provision of security? A third Likert test (Security Specialist Test -
Test I Part B) was again administered to the security specialist sample addressing the 
research question; Does an apathetic attitude towards security result in security 
decaying? 
The two tests administered to the security specialist sample provided results from 
which some determinations could be made. The Security Specialist Test - Test I Part 
A consisted of a number of sub- concepts which may be included in an effective 
security function, allowing one to argue that effective security consists of many varied 
elements, with the over riding factor being the ability to reduce risk exposure to an 
acceptable level. The Security Specialist Test- Test 1 Part B provided conclusive 
results, suggesting, but without proving, that apathetic attitudes towards security will 
result in security decaying 
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The Security Effectiveness Test- Test 2 which was administered to the non - security 
sample, produced inconclusive results. This sample proved to be indecisive, neither 
agreeing nor disagreeing with whether or not effective security will lead to a lack of 
security incidence and in tum apathy. Therefore no conclusions could be drawn. 
The results achieved are only representative of the attitudes of the respondents from 
within the sample. The two tests that derived conclusive results can not be generalised 
across the whole security specialist population. This was the major limitation of the 
investigation. 
The recommendations resulting from the study include the need to further research the 
security decay theory in a longitudinal study, as well as researching the section of the 
theory which was excluded in this study. A longitudinal study may produce 
generalisable results which may in fact, lead to the security decay theory being one of 
theoretical value. 
The implications for security specialists are that they need to have an awareness of the 
ramifications of having effective security. Although some results were inconclusive, it 
is postulated by the security decay theory that when effective security is achieved, 
attitudes of apathy towards security are most likely. Also, the fact that the non-
security sample were generally unsure about all sub- concepts put to them highlights 
the need for efficient and effective awareness and education programs. 
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Appendix A 
Security Specialist Test • Test 1 
Part A 
I. The assessing of threat must be SA A NS D SD 
conducted for security to be 
effective 
2. The assessing of criticality must SA A NS D SD 
be carried out if security is to be 
effective 
3. Detennining probability of threat SA A NS D SD 
occurrence is an important 
component of a security program 
4. effective security is achieved when SA A NS D SD 
security managers habitually react 
to incidence without prior analysis 
5. effective security is achieved with SA A NS D SD 
the practicing of risk management 
which allows the analyst to pre· 
empt security incidence in both 
frequency and consequences 
6. rather than the ability to reduce SA A NS D SD 
security risk, security should only 
be deemed effective when all risk 
is eliminated 
7. unless the risk is known in the SA A NS D SD 
absolute, money should not be 
spent on security initiatives 
8. effective security will be a profit SA A NS D SD 
generating operation for the 
organisation 
9. for security to be effective, one SA A NS D SD 
does not need to consider threat 
10. The frequency of security threat SA A NS D SD 
occurrence need not be assessed 
for security to be deemed effective 
II. security will only be effective SA A NS D SD 
when it focuses upon the security 
releYance of people, technology 
and infonnation 
12. Generic management processes SA A NS D SD 
are irrelevant to the management 
of a security function 
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13. security can only be effective with SA A NS D SD 
company wide support, thereby 
warranting integration 
14. in order for security to become SA A NS D SD 
effective, it needs to continually 
communicate its message via 
awareness and education programs 
15. effective security will be a SA A NS D SD 
financial burden on the 
organisation 
16. The assessment of criticality I SA A NS D SD 
consequence is not required for a 
security program to be effective 
17. a security function which reduces SA A NS D SD 
identified threat consequence will 
be deemed effective 
18. a security function which reduces SA A NS D SD 
identified threat frequency will be 
deemed effective 
19. in detennining whether or not SA A NS D SD 
security is effective, an analysis of 
its ability to generate profit is not 
considered 
20. security is more likely to be SA A NS D SD 
effective when it incorporates 
generic managerial processes 
21. for security to be effective, the SA A NS D SD 
security manager must work 
towards integrating the security 
function into all organisational 
areas 
22. security can fulfil its aims without SA A NS D SD 
the co - operation of company 
personnel 
23. security is a distinctly separate SA A NS D SD 
function and should exist outside 
the realm of all other 
organisational departments 
24. awareness programs are only one SA A NS D SD 
factor that must be established so 
that security can be effective 
25. the application of security theory SA A NS D SD 
will not influence security 
effectiveness as security theories 
are, in the main, irrelevant 
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26. investigations are unimportant SA A NS D SD 
when attempting to achieve a state 
of effective security 
27. intelligence will provide the SA A NS D SD 
necessary proactive element in a 
security program 
28. a security function need only be SA A NS D SD 
reactive in order to be effective 
29. the process of self evaluation is SA A NS D SD 
unnecessary and is a burden on 
security 
30. security programs that implement SA A NS D SD 
security theory such as defence in 
depth and CPTED are more likely 
to be effective 
31. no standard of effectiveness need SA A NS D SD 
be set for the security function 
32. security need not be concerned SA A NS D SD 
with legal issues 
33. security can be effective regardless SA A NS D SD 
of the security managers 
knowledge of security 
34. a security function need only be SA A NS D SD 
proactive in order to be effective 
35. investigations will provide the SA A NS D SD 
reactive clement in a security 
program 
36. the security function must SA A NS D SD 
establish a means of determining 
effectiveness in order to justify 
expenditure 
37. the security function must have an SA A NS D SD 
understanding of how the relevant 
laws will influence the way in 
which operations are conducted 
38. to ensure security is effective, the SA A NS D SD 
security manager and officers must 
uphold extremely high integrity 
39. to ensure the organisation is not SA A NS D SD 
liable to litigation, the security 
function should ensure all policies 
and procedures are formally 
documented 
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40. security can only be effective if it SA A NS D SD 
undergoes a process of self 
evaluation to determine whether 
the defined objectives have been 
met 
41. continual security awareness and SA A NS D SD 
education programs are 
unnecessary as security can be 
effective without these programs 
42. for security to be effective, an SA A NS D SD 
investigation capability is 
necessary 
43. intelligence is an irrelevant SA A NS D SD 
practice in effective security 
programs 
44. both reactive and proactive SA A NS D SD 
elements are required for security 
to be effective 
45. the use of intelligence is a vital SA A NS D SD 
component in ensuring security is 
effective 
46. security managers must have SA A NS D SD 
sufficient knowledge of security in 
order for security to be effective 
47. a security manager's integrity has SA A NS D SD 
no influence on the effectiveness 
of security 
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Appendix~ 
Security Specialist Test • Test 1 
PartB 
I. the effectiveness of security is SA A NS D SD 
dependant on the compliance by 
staff in following procedure~ 
2. security will remain unchanged SA A NS D SD 
when procedures and polices ace 
not complied with 
3. when people become apathetic SA A NS D SD 
towards security, security's ability 
to counter threats diminish 
4. situations whereby staff perceive SA A NS D SD 
security to be unnecessary will 
cause the level of security 
effectiveness to decrease 
5. to ensure effective security, SA A NS D SD 
security managers must have staff 
support for all implemented 
security policies and procedures 
6. compliance by staff of the security SA A NS D SD 
procedures has no bearing on the 
effectiveness of security 
7. security will remain effective SA A NS D SD 
when slaff become apathetic 
8. security has decayed when SA A NS D SD 
procedures and polices are not 
complied with 
9. when staff become apathetic SA A NS D SD 
towards security, security wUI 
decay 
10. security managers can reasonably SA A NS D SD 
suspect that security will be 
effective, whether or not the staff 
support the initiatives 
implemented 
II. security's level of effectiveness is SA A NS D SD 
in no way effected by the negative 
perception staff have of security 
12. security's ability to counter threats SA A NS D SD 
will not diminish when people 
become apathetic towards security 
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AppendixC 
Security Effectiveness Test • Test 2 
I. effective security is an achievable SA A NS D SD 
state 
2. when security is effective, security SA A NS D SD 
risk will be reduced 
3. threat occurrence is unlikely when SA A NS D SD 
security is ineffective 
4. you do not follow security SA A NS D SD 
procedures when you feel they arc 
unnecessary 
5. effective security is not an SA A NS D SD 
achievable state 
6. effective security will not reduce SA A NS D SD 
breaches of security 
7. a Jack of security knowledge SA A NS D SD 
results in apathy towards security 
8. even though security procedures in SA A NS D SD 
place seem unnecessary, you still 
comply with them 
9. a lack of security kno~,~;ledge ha.<; SA A NS D SD 
no bearing on the degree of apathy 
towards security 
10. when security is effective, threat SA A NS D SD 
occurrence is unlikely 
II. when one is not aware of the SA A NS D SD 
importance of security, one is 
likely to be apathetic 
12. when you do not experience SA A NS D SD 
security incidents, you become 
apathetic towards security 
13. a lack of security incidence will SA A NS D SD 
result in one perceiving security to 
be unnecessary 
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14. when you do not experience SA A NS D SD 
security incidents, you remain 
compliant with all security 
procedures and policies 
15. when you do nnt experience SA A NS D SD 
breaches of security, you become 
complacent towards security 
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AppendixD 
Face Validity - Security Specialist Evaluation and Effectiveness Tests 
The security specialist evaluation test and the security effectiveness test were 
examined by Clif Smith with the purpose of examining the effectiveness of the 
instruments to perform the functions outlined by their objectives. The tests are setting 
out to gain insight into the perceptions of effective security and security decay by 
experienced security personnel at security management and consultant levels, as weJI 
a~ non security people alike. 
The tests are composed of strong statements in several categories to be responded to 
by a Likert scale. An examination of the tests shows them to be substantial in content 
and application, and that the tests will most satisfactorily fulfil their functional 
requirements. 
The tests have face validity for the proposed function and applications of the 
instruments. 
Associate Professor Clifton Smith 
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AppendixE 
Pilot Study Raw Data - Security Specialist Test - Test 1 (Part A) 
Statements SA A NS D SD 
I. The assessing of threm 
must be conducted for 2 I 
securitv to be effective 
2. The assessing of 
criticality must be 2 I 
carried out if security is 
to be effective 
3. Determining probability 
of threat occurrence is a 2 I 
vital component of a 
secur!tv orol!ram 
4. effective security is 
achieved when security I 2 
managers habitually 
react to incidence 
without orior analvsis 
5. effective security is 
achieved with the I 2 
practicing of risk 
management which 
allows the analyst to pre 
• empt security 
incidence in both 
frequency and 
consequences 
6. rather than the ability to 
reduce security ri!.k, 3 
security should only be 
deemed effective when 
all risk is eliminated 
7. money should not be 
spent on security unless I 2 
the risk is known in the 
absolute 
8. effective security will 
be a profit generating 2 I 
operation for the 
orl!anisation 
9. One need not review 
threat for security to be I 2 
effective 
10. The frequency of 
security threat I 2 
occurrence is a factor 
which need not be 
assessed for security to 
be deemed effective 
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IL security will only be 
effective when it I 2 
focuses upon the 
security relevance of 
people, technology and 
information 
12. Generic management 
processes are irrelevant I 2 
to the management of a 
securitv function 
13. security can only be 
effective with company 3 
wide support, thereby 
warranting integration 
14. in order for security to 
become effective. it 2 I 
needs to continually 
communicate its 
message via awareness 
and education pro.e:rams 
15. effective security will 
be a financial burden on I 2 
the organisation 
16. effective security is 
dctennined hy its ahility 2 I 
to g.enerate profit 
17. The assessment of 
criticality I consequence I 2 
is not required for a 
security program to be 
effective 
18. a security function 
which reduce.<; I I I 
identified threats in 
both consequence and 
frequency will be 
deemed effective 
19. security's ahility to 
generate profit does not I 2 
factor into an analysis 
of whether security is 
effective 
20. security is more likely 
to be effective when it I 2 
incorporates generic 
mana~erial processes 
90 
Security Decay : The erosion of effective security 
Statements SA A NS D SD 
21. for security to be 
effective, the security 3 
manager must work 
towards integrating the 
security function into all 
or~anisational areas 
22. security can fulfil its 
aims without the co • I 2 
operation of company 
I personnel 
23. security is a distinctly 
separate function and 3 
should exist outside the 
realm of all other 
organisational 
departments 
24. awareness programs are 
only one factor that I 2 
must be established so 
that security can be 
effective 
25. the application of 
security theory will not 3 
influence security 
effectiveness as security 
theories arc, in the 
main, irrelevant 
26. investigations are 
unimportant when I 2 
attempting to achieve a 
state of effective 
security 
27. intelligence will provide 
the necessary proactive 2 I 
element in a security 
I pro}!:ram 
28. a security function need 
only be reactive in 3 
order to be effective 
29. the process of self 
evaluation is I 2 
unnecessary and is a 
burden on security 
30. security programs that 
implement security 2 I 
theory such as defence 
in depth and CPTED 
are more likely to be 
effective 
31. no standard of 
effectiveness need be 3 
set for the security 
function 
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Statements SA A NS D SD 
32. security need not be 
concerned with legal I 2 
issues 
33. security can be effective 
regardless of the I I I 
security managers 
knowled.e:e of security 
34. a security function need 
only be proactive in 2 I 
order to be effective 
35. investigations will 
provide the reactive I I I 
clement in a security 
program 
36. the security function 
must establish a means 2 I 
of determining 
effectiveness in order to 
justify expenditure 
37. the security function 
must have an 2 I 
understanding of how 
the relevant Jaws will 
influence the way in 
which operations arc 
conducted 
38. to ensure security is 
effective, the security J 
manager and officers 
must uphold extremely 
hi.e;h intc~rity 
39. to ensure the 
organisation is not 3 
liable to litigation, the 
security function should 
ensure all policies and 
procedures arc formally 
documcnt::d 
40. security can only be 
effective if it undergoes J 
a process of self 
evaluation to detennine 
whether the defined 
objectives have been 
mot 
41. continual s~curity 
awareness and I 2 
education programs arc 
unnecessary as security 
can be effective without 
these programs 
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Statements SA A NS D SD 
42. the use of investigations 
play an important role I I I 
in ensuring security is 
effective 
43. intelligence is an 
irrelevant practice in 3 
effective security 
I programs 
44. both reactive and 
proactive clements arc 2 I 
required for security to 
be effective 
45. the usc of intelligence is 
a vital component in 3 
ensuring security is 
effective 
46. security managers must 
have suflicient 2 I 
knowledge of security 
in order for security to 
be effective 
47. the integrity and 
previous history nf the I I I 
security manager will 
have nn innuencc on 
the effectiveness nf 
security 
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Pilot Study Raw Data • Security Effectiveness Test - Test 2 
Statements SA A NS D SD 
I. effective ~curity is 0:1n 
achievable state J 
2. when security is 
effective, l>C<:urity risk I I I 
will be rcdu..:ed 
J. when l>Ccurit~ i~ 
eliminating !>l"curity 2 I 
nsl. the need fm 
sccurit\' decn::a..'e~ 
•• 
threat tx:curren..:e i~ 
unlikely \\hen So~:..:urny 2 I 
is ineffcctiv.:: 
5. you dn nn: foil ow I 
sc..:urity rro..:edun.:~ 2 
\\hen ynu kd they arc 
unnccessan· 
6. effe..:tin:: ~ccurity JS not 
an a..:hievahlc ~tate 3 
7. effective security will 
not reduce breaches of I I I 
security 
R. a lack of security 
knowledge re~ults in J 
apathv towards ~ecuriw 
9. even though security 
procedures in place J 
seem unnecessary. you 
still comply with them 
10. a lack of security 
knowledge has no I 2 
bearing on the degree of 
apathy towards security 
II. when security is 
effective, threat 2 I 
occurrence is unlikely 
12. when security is 
eliminating security 2 
risk, security 
procedures arc 
maintained 
13. when one is not aware 
of the importance of J 
security, one is likely to 
be apathetic 
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Statements SA A NS D so 
14. when you do not 
experience security I 2 
incidents, you become 
apathetic towards 
security 
15. a lack of security 
incidence will result in 
one perceiving security 
3 
to be unnecessary 
16. when you do not 
experience security 2 I 
incidents, you remain 
compliant with all 
security procedures and 
I policic~ 
17. when you do not 
experience breaches of 3 
security, you become 
complacent towards 
securit•· 
95 
Security Decay: The erosion of effective security 
Pilot Study - Security Specialist Test - Test 1 (Part B) 
Statements SA A NS D so 
I. the effectiveness of 
security is dependant on 2 I 
the compliance by staff 
in followinf!: procedures 
2. security will remain 
unchanged when I I I 
procedures and polices 
arc not comolied with 
3. when people become 
apathetic towards 3 
security, security's 
ability to counter threats 
diminish 
4. siluations whereby staff 
perceive security to he 2 I 
unnece:,;sary will cause 
the level of security 
effectiveness to 
decrease 
5. to ensure effective 
security, security 2 I 
managers must have 
staff support for all 
implemented security 
nolicics and procedures 
6. compliance by staff of 
the security procedures 3 
has no hearing on the 
effectiveness of sc,~urity 
7. security will remain 
effective when staff I 2 
become apathetic 
8. security has decayed 
when procedures and I 2 
polices arc not 
complied with 
9. when staff become 
apathetic towards 3 
security, security will 
decav 
10. security managers can 
rea~onably suspect that 2 I 
security will be 
effective, whether or 
not the staff support the 
initiatives implemented 
I I. security's level of 
effectiveness is in no 3 
way effected by the 
negative perception 
staff have of security 
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12. security's ability to 
counter threats will not 3 
diminish when people 
become apathetic 
towards security 
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AppendixF 
Security Decay • the erosion of effective security 
This study is being conducted in order to fulfil the research component of the 
Bachelor Of Science (Security) Honours degree at Edith Cowan University. This 
research is being conducted independently, with the researcher having no affiliations 
with any organisation or institution. 
The study is focusing on a new theory in security called "security decay" and it is 
hoped that with your participation, an insight will be achieved into the perceived 
relevance and merit llfthe theory. 
Below you will find some statements about effective security and the relationship 
between apathetic attitudes towards security and security decay. I would like to know 
what your feeling is regarding each statement. There are no right or wrong answers so 
chose the response option you feel is the most appropriate. 
Opposite each statement is a response option. Please circle the response option you 
feel is most appropriate and be sure to answer every statement. 
You will remain anonymous, unless you wish to be personally acknowledged for your 
participation. 
Thank you for your a'isistance 
Shawn McClure 
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Code 
SA Strongly Agree 
A Agree 
NS Not Sure 
D Disagree 
SD Strongly Disagree 
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AppendixG 
Mean Statement Scores 
Security Specialist Test • Test 1 (Part A) 
Management of the Security Function 
Statements Mean Score 
I. 4.73 
2. 4.80 
3. 4.67 
4. 4.20 
5. 4.47 
6. 4.47 
7. 4.00 
8. 3.67 
9. 4.53 
10. 4.00 
II. 3.93 
12. 4.53 
13. 4.67 
15. 4.33 
16. 4.27 
17. 3.80 
18. 3.67 
19. 3.67 
20. 4.27 
21. 4.53 
22. 4.60 
23. 4.40 
28. 4.67 
34. 4.13 
44. 4.40 
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Awareness I Education 
Statements Mean Score 
14. 4.60 
24. 4.47 
41. 4.53 
Application of Security Theory 
Statements Mean Score 
25. 4.40 
30. 4.27 
Investigation I Intelligence 
Statements Mean Score 
26. 3.80 
27. 3.60 
35. 2.60 
42. 3.93 
43. 4.40 
45. 4.20 
Determining I Measuring Effectiveness 
Statements Mean Score 
29. 4.60 
31. 4.73 
36. 4.33 
40. 4.47 
Legal Aspects 
Statements Mean Score 
32. 4.67 
37. 4.47 
39. 4.60 
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Professionalism of the Security Manager 
Statements Mean Score 
33. 3.80 
38. 4.53 
46. 3.87 
47. 4.53 
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Security Effectiveness Test - Test 2 
Effective security is an achievable state 
Statements Mean Score 
I. 3.92 
5. 3.92 
Effective security causes a lack of security incidence 
Statements Mean Score 
2. 4.25 
3. 3.67 
6. 3.67 
10. 3.17 
A lack of security incidence causes apathy towards security 
Statements Mean Score 
4. 2.42 
7. 3.92 
8. 2.42 
9. 3.50 
II. 3.83 
12. 3.58 
13. 3.58 
14. 2.50 
15. 3.67 
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Security Specialist Test - Test 1 (Part B) 
An attitude of apathy causes decay 
Statements Mean Score 
I. 4.33 
2. 3.20 
3. 4.60 
4. 4.53 
5. 4.27 
6. 4.60 
7. 4.47 
8. 4.27 
9. 4.33 
10. 4.27 
11. 4.47 
12. 4.33 
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